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A physicist’s belief. John Polkinghorne’s consonance
of theology and science1
When popular physicist Stephen Hawking dreams at the end of
his best-selling Brief history of time of a Great UnifyingTheory (GUT)
which would be able to merge the major physical theories describing
the laws of nature, he goes on to say:
However, if we discover a complete theory, it should in time be
understandable by everyone, not just by a few scientists. Then
we shall all, philosophers, scientists and just ordinary people,
be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it
is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that,
it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason — for then
we should know the mind of God2.
John Polkinghorne, Hawking’s colleague at Cambridge Univer-
sity, is on the one hand critical of such an approach. “What is God do-
1 This contribution is a translated, edited and much abbreviated version of chap-
ter 2 in Andreas Losch, Jenseits der Konflikte. I thank the publisher Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht for the permission to make use of the material.
2 Hawking, A brief history of time: From the big bang to black holes, p. 193.
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ing in the book at all?”3. On the other hand, he is himself searching for
his own very particular version of a GUT. “There is indeed a Theory
of Everything, but a theory that is much grander and more compre-
hensive and intellectually satisfying than any Grand Unified Theory
of Particle Physics could ever be”4. For former particle physicist Polk-
inghorne, this theory is his new field of work: theology5. How does
he come to this? In order to understand this, this article aims first to
present Polkinghorne’s key ideas in their basic development, before
looking more closely at his creed.
1. The development of Polkinghorne’s key ideas
John Charlton Polkinghorne, K.B.E, F.R.S6, who studied under
Abdus Salam and is a former pupil and colleague of Paul Dirac, be-
longs to the group of theoretical physicists who co-developed the
standard model of the quark structure of matter that is still valid
today7. Of his two teachers, both Nobel laureates in physics, the
clear mind of Dirac particularly influenced him. The publishers of
the Festschrift for Dirac’s 80th birthday praise him as follows:
The simplicity and profound logic of his thought was reflected
in all his theories of physics. This became particularly clear
when he said, ‘God used beautiful mathematics in creating the
world8.
One might almost think that Polkinghorne had taken this re-
mark literally. When the dust began to settle around the correct
model of quantum mechanics at the end of the 1970s, Polkinghorne,
3 Polkinghorne, The Mind of God?, p. 4.
4 Polkinghorne, Faith, science and understanding, p. 25.
5 Cf. ibid., p. 25.
6 John C. Polkinghorne has been knighted 1997 and was elected Fellow of the
Royal Society in 1974 already.
7 Cf. Polkinghorne, The life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 956.
8 Kursonoglu & Wigner, Reminiscenses about a great physicst, p. xv.
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who had always been a devout Christian9 began to look for new
challenges:
The pursuit of science is an aspect of the imago dei. Therefore
it does not seem to me strange that these words which I have
written while Professor of Mathematical Physics in the Uni-
versity of Cambridge will be published when I am an ordinand
studying for the Anglican priesthood10
— this is how he ends his popular science book, The particle play, in
1979.
The point in time at which he moved from physics to theology
is not without significance in terms of understanding his intention.
The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics that was by this
time broadly established and was to be confirmed by experiments in
the early 1980s11 implies that one should only occupy oneself with
what is being measured in a particular experiment, and resolutely ig-
nore everything else — as science journalist David Lindley puts it,
“quantum mechanics gets the answer right, and never mind how”12.
However, this runs counter to the approach of physics: “The normal
rule in physics, more so than in any other kind of science, is never to
stop asking questions”13.
It could be said that it is precisely through his move that Polk-
inghorne remains loyal to the approach of physics. He begins by
asking “why” and takes the necessary step from physics up to meta-
physics. “Why should one not be allowed to search for what is, as it
were, behind physics?”, Heisenberg was already asking14.
I do not see why there should be a ban on reflecting on the
more general questions, because there are said to be no […]
9 Polkinghorne, The life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 955.
10 Polkinghorne, The particle play, p. 126.
11 Cf. Polkinghorne, Rochester roundabout, p. 159.
12 Lindley, The end of physics, p. 98.
13 ibid., p. 98.
14 Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze, p. 286.
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clear terms; for if such a ban were in place, one could not even
understand quantum theory15.
For the fundamental physicist, it is unavoidable to examinemeta-
physical questions: he must interpret. Heisenberg’s development of
the uncertainty principle was at first of purely epistemological nature,
but within a very short time he and most other physicists had given it
an ontological interpretation16. The metaphysical strategy which the
great majority of scientists apply in this process, consciously or not, is
the search for maximum correlation between epistemology and ontol-
ogy, a programme which Polkinghorne identifies as a kind of critical
realism. The observer and the object being observed cannot be sep-
arated. A “realistic” world-view starts from the premise that the ob-
ject being observed contributes the defining proportion to the knowl-
edge. This world-view must, however, also be “critical,” because in
some areas, as in the quantum world, recognised reality appears to be
counter-intuitive in terms of common sense, so a naive “objectivity”
cannot be enough: “The real is the intelligible, not the observable”17.
“It is the desire to understand the world that motivates all those who
work in fundamental physics,” says Polkinghorne. “…the search for
understanding will be incomplete if it does not include within itself
the religious quest”18.
1.1. The whole world is God’s creation
At the same time, he warns against a simplifying reductionism.
The one world in which we live is a many-layered, value-filled reality,
of which physics only deals with the “lowest“ level. Chemistry, biol-
ogy, psychology, sociology and also theology describe more complex
15 Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze, p. 283.
16 Cf. Polkinghorne, The metaphysics of divine action, p. 148. It remains ques-
tionable to me, whether this presentation of Heisenberg is fully justified. Potentially
it stems from an interpretation of Ian Barbour, Issues in science and religion, p. 303f.
17 Ibid., p. 172.
18 Polkinghorne, Science and creation, p. xi.
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levels, at which new realities emerge and exist. Human beings are
more than genetically constructed survival machines, and a mecha-
nistic description of them is an anachronism. A world operating like
clockwork? Quantum mechanics has banished the demon of deter-
minism once and for all. To the fundamental physicist, in particular,
it becomes clear that the subatomic world can no longer be reduced
to an atomistic outlook, as demonstrated by the quantum principle
of non-locality19. A move towards holism is taking place in science,
which points towards the possibility of holistic natural laws. Is there,
in addition to the effect of the parts of a system on the whole, perhaps
also a reverse effect of the whole on its parts? Is that not the expe-
rience as we see it in the actions of the human person as a whole?
Polkinghorne also asks: Can God’s influence on creation not also be
understood in the same way? God’s creative action is not restricted
to the creation in the beginning, but also expresses itself in the work
of Providence as creatio continua. In the fruitful interaction between
“chance” and necessity in the evolution of life, Polkinghorne there-
fore sees more than genetic variations and environmental influences;
in it he sees God’s loving intention towards the world, His gift of free-
dom and the expression of His loyalty20. When Jacques Monod con-
cludes from the significance of blind chance that mankind is alone in
the universe21, Polkinghorne counters this with the vision of Julian
of Norwich: “Indeed nothing happens by luck or by chance, but all is
through the foresight and wisdom of God”22.
Polkinghorne thereby enters the arena of the classic dispute be-
tween theology and science. Even if a defensive attitude can still be
detected, it is also clear that an evolutionary worldview has now been
accepted by theologians23. In the case of Polkinghorne, however, this
evolutionary worldview is combined in a very interesting way with
19 Cf. Polkinghorne, The metaphysics of divine action, p. 149.
20 Cf. Polkinghorne, Science and creation, p. xiii.
21 Cf. Monod, Chance and necessity, p. 180.
22 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, p. 80. Cf. 2.4 »The miracle of
Kenosis«.
23 Cf. Polkinghorne, Science and theology, p. 5.
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his convictions as a physicist. It is the understanding of the anthropic
principle that the fruitful potential of evolution must of necessity al-
ready be part of the design of the finely-tuned laws of nuclear physics.
God thereby reveals Himself not only as the free origin of contingent
events (Wolfhart Pannenberg), but also as the ground of phenomenal
order24. He is equally the ground of being and of becoming.
1.2. Space for action in the “chaos”
The physical possibility of thinking of true becoming, however,
is onlymade clear by the new kind of physics of complex dynamic sys-
tems. It conveys an understanding of the unpredictability of the future
of the world, which for Polkinghorne offers the possibility of describ-
ing ourselves (and to a certain extent also God) as highly-complex
systems which have true freedom of action25. He is, of course, aware
of the philosophical debate about freedom of will, but for him this is
a fundamental fact of human experience26.
As a serious particle physicist, however, Polkinghorne guards
against deliberations which seek to make a direct link between the
uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics and the freedom of the
human spirit27. He finds it more meaningful also to apply the con-
cept of critical realism in the field of classical physics. If epistemol-
ogy models ontology, it must also be possible to interpret the limits of
24 Cf. Polkinghorne, Science and creation, p. 63.
25 Cf. Polkinghorne, Science and providence, p. 2.
26 It may be that this deep conviction is an expression of his Anglican belief,
defending itself against Arminianism and Calvinism: “Calvinism and Arminianism
are both distortions of the truth. We can do justice to the Gospel only if we hold
firmly both to the absolute souvereignty of God and to the moral freedom of man,
recognizing that is only in the depths of the divine wisdom that what appears to us
as a logical contradiction is resolved” (Neill, Anglicanism, p. 141).
27 The missing link between microcosm and macrocosm, articulated in the mea-
surement problem, prohibits such conclusions. For understanding the measure-
ment problem see John Polkinghorne, Science and theology, pp. 28–30. Nevertheless,
Polkinghorne does hint at a possible connection, see ibid., p. 43.
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knowledge in the field of classical physics as ontological openness28,
in which the whole can affect its parts (and also human beings can
affect their bodies). Polkinghorne finds such macroscopic limits to
knowledge in the unpredictable behaviours of chaotic systems. But
how does it fit in with this that the equations forming the basis of the
systems have a deterministic nature? People speak of “deterministic
chaos”. Polkinghorne responds to this by classifying the determinism
of the equations “as an approach to a more differentiated and adapt-
able description of reality”29. Their determinism is then not an intrin-
sic property, but a “downwards” emerging property resulting from
the isolated observation of systems. In Polkinghorne’s holistic con-
textualism, human action becomes compatible with the integration
of mankind into natural law. Equally, God’s action can be conceived
as being within the free space of the laws of nature, and since there
are intrinsic gaps, this does not mean that He is a “God of the Gaps”.
Polkinghorne knows, of course, that these assumptions are specula-
tive. They aim to protect the freedom of God and of mankind from
scientific reductionisms, which Polkinghorne believes to be no less
speculative.
1.3. The fruitfulness of beauty
It is critical realism that assumes a creative participation of
the human mind in the process of research. Thus, the principle of
economy, the urge towards harmonisation, by which fundamental
physics is also driven, highlights the influence of metaphysical crite-
ria in research. The search for harmonisation, for the inspired equa-
tion, is the search for beauty — according to a very widespread “be-
lief” among physicists30. Polkinghorne defends himself resolutely
28 It is assumed that we deal with intrinsic and final limits of knowledge here.
29 Polkinghorne, Ordnung und Chaos, p. 369.
30 Polkinghorne quotes Dirac, who said about Schrödinger and himself: “It was
a sort of act of faith with us that any equations which describe fundamental laws
of Nature must have great mathematical beauty in them” (Polkinghorne, Rochester
roundabout, p. 174).
104 Andreas Losch
against philosophers of science (in this case Andrew Pickering31) who
for this reason want to interpret the world of high-energy physics
as a socio-cultural construct, and the development of high-energy
physics within the meaning of Thomas Kuhn as a mere “paradigm
shift” between incommensurable linguistic worlds32. Polkinghorne’s
own paradigm is the uncertainty principle, interpreted from the point
of view of critical realism33. Scientists are merely the cartographers
of the pre-existing global reality, but every revision paints a more ac-
curate picture. Thus, the theory of relativity has not declared classical
physics invalid, but merely inaccurate — although it is still accurate
enough to send a space probe to Mars34. The relevant criticisms of
science do, however, contain moments of truth, which Polkinghorne
sees best represented in the reflection of Michael Polanyi that in the
search for beauty, “personal knowledge” plays a fundamental role in
the motivation of scientific thought. Scientific research is based on
unspoken qualities which are acquired through practical experience
within the scientific community. All the same, every theory must un-
dergo verification through experiments. “Ye shall know them by their
fruits” (Matt. 7:16) is a significant Bible verse for Polkinghorne in this
context35.
1.4. Polkinghorne as a scientist-theologian
Polkinghorne works in close connection with the work of Ian
Barbour and Arthur Peacocke, who, like him, had successful scientific
careers before devoting themselves to theology. In this work, a sci-
entific way of thinking can possibly be detected, which pays more at-
tention to the reliability and repeatability of results than to their own
31 Polkinghorne refers in Rochester roundabout (p. 167) to Andrew Pickering,
Constructing quarks.
32 Cf. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions.
33 Cf. Polkinghorne, The life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 961.
34 Cf. Polkinghorne, Rochester roundabout, p. 165.
35 Cf. Polkinghorne, One world, p. 16.
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originality36. The application of this way of thinking in the human-
ities is, of course, original, but also points to a certain inexperience
with the tradition of the humanities. As a scientist, Polkinghorne,
even when tackling theological questions, does not want to give up
tried-and-tested and approved scientificmethods. Instead of deducing
general truths from abstract principles, he wants to develop the theo-
retical superstructure on top of the phenomenal basis. Polkinghorne
calls this inductive-oriented work “bottom-up” thinking. It is remi-
niscent of the Anglican scriptural principle: “Show us a verse in the
Bible that we do not teach, and we will teach it; show us a verse
in our teaching that is against Scripture, and we will stop teaching
it”37.
Even if there are some differences resulting from the special na-
ture of the theological object of knowledge, for Polkinghorne theol-
ogy and science are closely related in terms of method. In comparison
with the other two scientist-theologians, he is certainly the one who,
in the search for agreements between the disciplines, most strongly
emphasises the individuality of the theological way of thinking. He
views the formulation of the Nicene Creed as a succinct summary
of the various New Testament testimonies of Christ, just as physicists
concentrate the physical global phenomena in the tables of formulae38
— and thereby stands fully in the Anglican tradition. It has already
been pointed out that this hardly has a systematic theology, “the usual
form of the re-formulation of belief is different: dialogue with the
respective dominant philosophical and scientific trend”39. For Polk-
inghorne the Nicene Creed forms the skeleton of belief that must be
fleshed out anew by each generation of believers. In his Gifford Lec-
tures, published as “The faith of a physicist”40, he honours this inten-
tion. It may seem unusual that a modern scientist chooses the focal
36 Cf. Barbour, Issues in science and religion, p. 176.
37 Neill, Anglikanische (Kirchen-)Gemeinschaft, p. 715.
38 Cf. Polkinghorne, The life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 957.
39 Neill, Anglikanische (Kirchen-)Gemeinschaft, p. 721.
40 This is the more telling American title of John Polkinghorne, Science and
Christian belief: Theological reflections of a bottom-up thinker .
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point of Christian orthodoxy in order to articulate his belief. Polk-
inghorne sees this as a challenge: “A scientist expects a fundamental
theory to be tough, surprising and exciting”41.
In a summary after twenty years of theological work, Polk-
inghorne still sees himself as “a physicist with very serious theologi-
cal interests”42, even if, as he says, he would like nothing more than
to be transformed into a New Testament scholar. — It is important
to have a certain sympathy for English humour, if one is to concern
oneself with John Polkinghorne. Just as he and his allies meet with
goodwill the theologians who attempt to take account of science, he
also expects a similar approach from theologians towards his mod-
els. Polkinghorne describes the experiments undertaken by him in
the Gifford Lectures, and those undertaken previously by the other
two “scientist-theologians”, as a kind of systematic “mini-theology”,
the principle value of which he sees, however, on the same level as the
specific contributions of liberation theology and feminist hermeneu-
tics43. Their own contribution aims to help avoid short-sighted falla-
cies from the viewpoint of a scientist. For example, when Wolfhart
Pannenberg states that the modern concepts of field and energy have
“spiritualised” physics, a physicist has to object, since Einstein’s fa-
mous equation, E = mc2, says nothing more than that energy is
interchangeable with matter44.
Polkinghorne is equally a missionary for science among theolo-
gians and a defender of belief among scientists. His belief in the
unity of knowledge is an expression of belief in the one God. For
this reason, Polkinghorne understands theology, as stated at the start
of this article, as a true and all-encompassing “great unifying the-
ory”45, which encompasses the sciences, the humanities and world
41 Polkinghorne, Science and Christian belief: Theological reflections of a bottom-up
thinker , p. 1.
42 Polkinghorne, The life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 957.
43 Cf. Polkinghorne, Belief in GodPolkinghorne:Theology, p. 84.
44 Cf. Polkinghorne, Faith, science and understanding, p. 162.
45 Ibid., p. 25.
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religions alike, while Stephen Hawking suggests that a successful
harmonisation could make the God hypothesis redundant.
2. Belief in God in an Age of Science
After this overview, given the title of this article, an analysis of
the core ideas of his book Belief in God in an age of science shall present
the focus of these deliberations. There, Polkinghorne offers a con-
cise presentation of his personal believes regarding natural theology,
philosophy of science, Divine Action and the idea of God’s kenosis.
There are, of course, many more theological areas, in which Polk-
inghorne exposes himself, but we will restrict ourselves here to the
topics mentioned.
2.1. A revised natural theology
Belief in God in an age of science for Polkinghorne means to be
certain
that there is a Mind and a Purpose behind the history of the
universe and the One whose veiled presence is intimated in
this way is worthy of worship and the ground of hope46.
This way, Polkinghorne summarizes beginning and end of his
theological thoughts. In dialog with the metaphysical attempts of his
scientific colleagues, Polkinghorne cares for a revised natural theol-
ogy47. Charles Darwin‘s theory of evolution wasn’t the end of any
natural theology, but, to the favor of theology, the end of an inter-
ventionist interpretation of Divine action48. Already Charles Kings-
ley greeted the publication of The Origin of species with the words,
46 Polkinghorne, Belief in God, p. 1.
47 Cf. Polkinghorne, The new natural theology.
48 Cf. Polkinghorne, Faith, science and understanding, p. 197. Concerning the
relation to Darwin see also Neill, Anglikanische (Kirchen-)Gemeinschaft, p. 720.
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God would allow creation “to make itself”49. There are two novelties
regarding this revised natural theology: first, it does not contradict
scientific knowledge any more, it only reconsiders the philosophical
interpretations based on these findings in a wider context. Second, its
achievements can only be regarding as “insights”50 and not as proofs.
Therefore, facing the ambiguities of evolution (we recall “nature red
in tooth and claw”), natural theology needs to be complemented with
a theology of nature:
We are not now looking to the physical world for hints of God’s
existence but to God’s existence as an aid for understanding
why things have developed in the physical world in themanner
that they have51.
It is the question of theodicy, which demonstrates the impor-
tance of meaning and of justice for humankind. We live in a world,
which is the carrier of value at all levels of our meeting with it. Be-
hind this, Polkinghorne sees the One who is worthy of worship; this
is Polkinghorne‘s revised version of the traditional axiological argu-
ment for the existence of God. “Scientific wonder at the rational order
of the universe is indeed a partial reading of »the mind of God«”, as
Polkinghorne comments on Hawking’s conclusion in his Brief history
of time. “Yet there is much more to the mind of God than science will
ever discover”52. To point out this “more” is theism’s contribution to-
day. The “cruciform pattern” of life through death53 could be regarded
as a hint, that the question of theodicy finds its lasting response in an
explicitly Christian theology. For Polkinghorne, only the hope for
life after death can guarantee the continued meaning of personal in-
49 Cf. Polkinghorne, Belief in God, p. 14.
50 Cf. Lonergan, Insight.
51 Polkinghorne, Belief in God, p. 13.
52 Ibid., p. 19.
53 This figure of thought stems from Holmes Rolston III, Science and religion,
which Polkinghorne does not show. Sometimes it is a problem with Polkinghorne
that in his attempt at a reader-friendly presentation with only few annotations, he
misses to track the origins of his thoughts.
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tegrity. This hope, borrowed deep down in the human mind, can also
be of interest for the modern scientist.
2.2. Philosophy of science as meta-physics
Polkinghorne early had the idea that “complementarity… is the
scientist’s equivalent of the theologian’s perichoresis, the mutual in-
dwelling of characteristics”54. It does not surprise us then that when
he later structures the search for truth in five phases, he makes the
history of the discovery of the double nature of light parallel to the
development of the Chalcedonensian dogma of the double nature of
Christ. Like Thomas Kuhn, Polkinghorne wants to base his philoso-
phy of science in history: history “as testing ground of philosophical
theorizing”55. Divergent from Kuhn, Polkinghorne does not speaks of
revolutions, but of moments of radical revision, and compares science
with the development of dogma instead with political agitation. The
postulated parallelism of the ways of knowing in theology and sci-
ence ends, where Dirac‘s “revelation”56 of quantum field theory solves
the double nature of light in a highly satisfying way, while the ecu-
menical councils up to Chalcedon stay focused on defending against
misinterpretations of the dogma. Theology can only make use of the
open language of symbols. Hence, a continuous wrestling with un-
solved problems is its usual situation, and the dogma must stay as it
is, a continuous challenge and enduring limit.
54 Polkinghorne, Science and creation, p. 70.
55 Polkinghorne, Belief in God, p. xii.
56 Cf. ibid., p. 27. Polkinghorne speculates about the involvement of the Holy
Spirit in such insights: “No doubt the activity of the unconscious mind plays an
important part in what has been going on, but the believer may well wish to sup-
pose that the hidden inspiration of the Spirit has also been involved in bringing new
insight” (Polkinghorne & Welker, Faith in the living God, p. 78).
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2.3. Mind and matter and God’s very special Divine Action
As stated initially, the fact that our mind can understand the
structures of nature with help of mathematics for Polkinghorne is
a consequence of the imago dei. Through the “unreasonable effec-
tiveness” of mathematics (Eugene Wigner), an “objective” discipline
defends the existence of an independent mental world, which Polk-
inghorne developed already in Science and Creation57. Divergent from
Platonism, this realm of ideas is for Polkinghorne a created world,
comparable to Moltmann‘s “created heaven” as space of possibili-
ties. Fundamental is Polkinghorne‘s conviction, that mind is not
supervening on matter, but complementary to it.
The only possibility appears to be a complementary world of
mind/matter in which these polar opposites cohere as contrast-
ing aspects of the world-stuff, encountered in greater or lesser
states of organization58.
Humans as psychosomatic “amphibians” participate in both
poles, mind and matter, while God as pure spirit acts (within prov-
idence) through information alone. Under these assumptions, God’s
like man’s action can be imagined in form of a downward, informa-
tional causality of the whole on its parts.
Polkinghorne argues in Belief in God in an age of science that
there is the need for a very concrete localization of the operation of
this holistic principle on the causal nexus of the physical world. He
localizes the causal joint in the manner, how a chaotic system’s tra-
jectory follows its strange attractor. As the divergent developments
of the trajectories can be understood as consequences of minimal dis-
turbances in the context of the whole, some intrinsic unpredictabil-
ity emerges, which Polkinghorne interprets critical realist as openess
for other activities. We recall that “epistemology models ontology”,
so the epistemological unpredictability hints at a real ontological un-
certainty and openness. Polkinghorne parallels quantum mechanics
57 Cf. Polkinghorne, Science and creation, ch. 5.
58 Ibid., p. 71.
A physicist’s belief 111
with chaotic systems, without claiming a causal connection between
the two theories. Rather, the uncertainty of our knowledge hints at
the existence of causalities that had been overlooked before: holistic
laws of nature. While their effect needs to be measurable in the emer-
gence of complexity, the providentia specialis happens hidden within
this new scientific possibility59. God’s action through active informa-
tion “is the translation […] of a long tradition of Christian thinking
that refers to the hidden work of the Spirit”60.
2.4. The miracle of Kenosis
As complex dynamic systems follow the flow of time, the passing
of time is a fundamental attribute of the universe. For Polkinghorne,
this has far reaching implications for the doctrine of God: if God
knows the universe in its temporality, then the experience of time
needs to find its place within the Divine Nature. This “gift of pro-
cess theology” is not difficult to accept for the religion of incarnation.
God’s Kenosis, expressed in this thought, is an underlying theme of
Polkinghorne’s theology. He does not only postulate a Kenosis of
God’s omnipotence in the creation of the world. In a world of true
becoming even God can’t know the future, because it simply doesn’t
exist yet. The consequent Kenosis of the God’s omniscience as well
emphasizes once more the freedom of creation and creature. “The
presence of such contingency does, however, suggest that the evo-
lution of life is not the unfolding of a totally predetermined plan”,
says Polkinghorne61. God’s spiritual Action is not to be understood
as interventionist influence within the nexus of energetic causes, and
has therefore to be understood as active information which does not
need an energetic carrier. By postulating holistic laws of nature, Polk-
inghorne cannot really avoid to make God a “cause among causes”.
59 Cf. Polkinghorne, The laws of nature.
60 Polkinghorne, Belief in God, p. 72.
61 Polkinghorne, Science and theology, p. 78.
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While criticizing this first as a degradation of God to a demiurge, he
later accepts it as a Kenosis of providence as well62.
3. Conclusion
When theology and science are treated with such seriousness,
it is only consequential that they enter an interplay, in which not
only traditional theology experiences fundamental changes, but also
science is confronted with the postulation of new laws of nature.
Polkinghorne distinguishes himself therefore from the widespread as-
sumption, only theology would need to learn from science. This fruit-
ful exchange across disciplinary borders is a unique feature (and also
the most disputed feature63) of his works.
Polkinghorne‘s approach of a “consonance” of the disciplines as-
sumes that both camps will only harmonize at the very end of it all.
“The answers to »How?« and to »Why?« must fit together without
strain”64. A philosophical examination of his consonance model is
to be found in Johannes Maria Steinke, John Polkinghorne: Konso-
nanz von Naturwissenschaft und Theologie65. On the one hand, Polk-
inghorne’s distinguishes himself from Barbour‘s idea of integration,
which would present for him an assimilation of theology to science.
On the other hand, he is convinced that “Physics constrains meta-
physics”, so there is an asymmetry in favor of the scientific founda-
tion. Is Polkinghorne’s approach physicalist at the end? His thinking
is shaped by his experiences as a physical scientist, for sure. Yet the
full quote regarding the constraints shows, that it is at least not his
intent to pursue physicalist thoughts.
62 Cf. Polkinghorne, Faith, science and understanding, p. 127; Polkinghorne, The
life and works of a bottom-up thinker, p. 961. Cf. also the interesting presentation in
Ignacio Silva, John Polkinghorne on divine action. I am not fully convinced, however,
that there really is a third phase.
63 Cf. Russell, Cosmology, pp. 130–132.
64 Polkinghorne, Science and theology, p. 22.
65 Steinke, John Polkinghorne.
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Physics — or science generally — constrains metaphysics, but
it does not determine it, just as the foundations of a house con-
strain what can be built on them, but they do not determine the
actual form of the edifice66.
As a non-scientist, one cannot get rid of the feeling, however,
that something may have been missed in Polkinghorne’s pleasantly
orthodox presentation. The missing terrain may be situated some-
where in the realm of culture. The role of the humanities, of which
theology could be considered a part, at least more than of science, ap-
pears as underdetermined. I have explored this attempt of a critique,
that our world is more than physics, elsewhere67.
Very early, in The particle play already, Polkinghorne considered
whether he does detect a “consonance between the world view of
Christianity and the world view of science”. He said, he did so, “but
I do not suppose that I can prove it for you, any more than someone
else could disprove it”68. The rationality of the world is what stroke
him. There, he is certainly not the only scientist who wonders about
this marvel: a world shot-trough with signs of Mind.
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